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This thesis examines the origins of the conflict which engulfed the former
Yugoslavia in 1991. Findings will indicate that the violence within this culturally diverse
and historically multi-ethnic region of Europe was not driven by ancient ethnic sentiments,
nor was it a "civil war" between "traditional tribal rivals" —fighting for "hundreds of
years"--; but was rather the direct result of a within-group (intra-state/inter-cultural)
political struggle. The study will demonstrate that the violence witnessed by the
international community can be traced to the destructive strategies adopted by a
threatened status-quo elite for political survival. Specifically, the source of this tragedy can
be traced to the post-Tito struggle for power in the face of political and economic reform;
with primary responsibility for the deterioration falling squarely on the shoulders of the
Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic. Through extensive manipulation of the Serbian
culture and its historical symbols, President Milosevic created an external threat to Serbia,
united the Serbs around him in a common fight for survival, and based his domestic and
foreign policies on the defeat of this fabricated threat. Far from an inevitable and
"spontaneous combustion" of ethnic hatreds, the conflict began as a coldly premeditated,
systematic, and violent power drive; fueled by hyper-nationalism and employing "ethnic
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For the past several years, the world has been bombarded and bewildered by myriad
interpretations and analyses concerning the Balkan violence. Clearly the bloodiest war in
Europe since WWII, the ongoing conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina has destroyed the
Yugoslav state, leveled entire cities, and resulted in over 250,000 casualties and millions
of Yugoslavs displaced and homeless. Various experts, intellectuals and statesmen have
described the conflict as an ancient civil war between backward and far-off clans; and the
international community continues to express alarm at this "European" conflagration
raging in the region between Italy and Greece.
What are the root causes of violent conflict throughout this culturally diverse and
historically multi-ethnic region of Europe? Are there adequate explanations for the
systematic destruction of the cosmopolitan society of Sarajevo —before the war, a shining
example of multi-ethnic, intermarried and religiously mixed culture— a Balkan ideology
that had stood against the division of its people into segregated groups for two
generations?
This study will argue that the conflict is not one of ancient ethnic sentiments or of
"civil war" between "traditional tribal rivals" —fighting for "hundreds of years"— nor is it
one of external security concerns; but is rather the direct result of within-group
(intra-state/inter-cultural) conflict. It is the result of a rational program of domestic
conflict waged along ethno-cultural lines by a threatened powerful elite; which embraced
and subsequently nurtured a budding nationalist movement, deliberately and
systematically manipulating and provoking it to create ethnic and cultural cleavages
within the region. The paper will demonstrate that the violence witnessed by the
international community can be traced to the destructive strategies adopted by a
ix
threatened status-quo elite for political survival. 1
The Balkans indeed have a historically rich and culturally complex past. Yet,
despite this "thousand year old history", the current conflict is one of modern political
survival. In fact, the source of the tragedy can be traced to the post-Tito struggle for
power in the face of political and economic reform; with primary responsibility for the
deterioration falling squarely on the shoulders of the Serbian President, Slobodan
Milosevid. Far from an inevitable and "spontaneous combustion" of ethnic hatreds, the
conflict began as a coldly premeditated, systematic, and violent power drive by
Milosevic, fueled by hyper-nationalism; and employing "ethnic cleansing" as the primary
means by which Milosevic" sought to dominate an ethnically pure "Greater Serbia".
As chief functionary of the declining Yugoslav Communist regime, Milosevic
embraced and became the voice of Serbian hyper-nationalism; adopting a "grand
strategy" which included the cultural re-coding and manipulation of his society in order
to emphasize ethno-nationalism as the only politically relevant identity, and depicting
potential political rivals as dangerous threats to the very existence of all Serbs and Serbia.
Beginning in 1987, he intentionally created (rather than responded to) threats to his
"Serbian nation" by purposefully provoking and fostering the outbreak of violent
nationalist conflict along ethno-cultural lines2 —even in areas with histories of successful
inter-marriage and inter-ethnic relations. Serbian President Milosevic created an external
'One of the theoretical pillars of this thesis will be anchored on the hypotheses of V.P.
Gagnon as outlined in his paper, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of
Serbia," International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, pp.130-166, Winter 1994/95.
2The phenomenon of "Serbian Nationalism" will be examined vis-a-vis the definitions
suggested by Steven Van Evera in his paper, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,"
International Security, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 5-39, Spring 1994.
threat to Serbia, united the Serbs around him in a common fight for survival, and based
his domestic and foreign policies on the fabricated threat.
Milosevic —Catalyst for Crisis
Slobodan Milosevic" represents a powerful synthesis or, more precisely
"symbiosis" 3
,
of Yugoslav Communism (political conservatism, support for centralism,
and resistance to meaningful change), Serbian nationalism (desire for a sovereign
"Greater Serbia"), Serbian Christian Orthodoxy, and the powerful Yugoslav People's
Army -and his personal management of this symbiosis has a profound effect on
developments in Yugoslavia. Warren Zimmerman describes Milosevic as "the slickest
con man in the Balkans". 4 Others have commented that he is a "consummate tactician,
political chameleon, master of the bob and weave and, for all that, the key player on the
Balkan scene...". 5 One might also add: "ruthless opportunist and violent destabilizer of
the Yugoslav Federation", whose cry of "strong Serbia, strong Yugoslavia" has ripped
the region into a patchwork of shell-shocked Southern Slavs.
The Red/Brown/Black/Gray Symbiosis
Milosevic's goals have focused primarily on gaining full control of the Serbian
state, and creating a unified country under Serbian domination, with a semi-free market
and a semi-democratic (ex-communist) government under his personal tutelage. His
3As described by Professor Norman Cigar, in his book Genocide in Bosnia - The Policy of
"Ethnic Cleansing", Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 1995.
4Zimmerman, Warren, "The Last Ambassador," Foreign Affairs, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 2-20,
March/April 1995.
5Karsten Prager, "The Balkans: Milosevic Plays Peacekeeper," Time Magazine, vol. 146,
no. 3, 17 July 1993.
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initial drive consisted of reestablishing Serbian control over the autonomous provinces of
Vojvodina and Kosovo.
Control of the Press
One of the primary means by which Milosevic has pursued his goals has been via
the Serbian media (print, broadcast and TV). In the following passage Sabrina Ramet
offers a glimpse of Serbian press manipulation and dissemination of nationalist
propaganda:
"To establish power in Serbia, Milosevic thought he needed a pliant press. He
therefore fired a number of editors and journalists at the prestigious Politika
publishing house, and the daily papers Politika and Politika ekspres as well as the
weekly magazines Duga and NIN became mere mouthpieces for Milosevic's
policies... Publications appeared which were the direct result of Milosevic's
nationalist policies... in 1987 a book was published which attempted to link the
Vatican with the misdeeds of the fascist Ustase of World War II —clearly an
attempt to undermine the Catholic Church, the cultural champion of the Serbs'
arch-rivals, the Croats."6
The Intelligentsia (Legitimation)
The Serbian intelligentsia played a leading part in the intellectual and cultural
"re-nationalization" of Serbia. From the earliest stages of his drive, Milosevic controlled
and manipulated the Serbian intellectual community, specifically the Serbian Academy of
Sciences and Arts (SANU). Considered by many to be the "spiritual standard-bearers" for
Serbian nationalism, members of SANU have untiringly published a number of
inflammatory documents and memorandums, and bear primary responsibility for the
cynical and nihilistic brand of Serbian nationalism —generating mass self-pity, anger and
hatred.




Nationalism has no rival either in mobilizing the masses against a common
threatening enemy or in its capacity to inspire self-sacrifice in defense of the home
nation, and Milosevic clearly recognized this potential source of power. The initial and
most significant of his political concessions might be described as the "Red/Brown"
symbiosis —or the Communist/Nationalist merger7 . By embracing and co-opting the
powerful force of Serbian nationalism (loyalty to "Greater Serbia"), Milosevic directed
the cultural wellspring of Serbian society into the service of the state, and more precisely,
into a personal force for self- preservation, and power acquisition. He fanned the
psychological flames of the Serbian masses for personal aggrandizement.
Serbian Orthodox Church (Black)
Another carefully cultivated and essential element of the symbiosis has been the
Serbian Orthodox church. Long mistreated and ignored, the church suddenly found itself
glorified in Milosevic's Serbian press. Priests began to participate in nationalist
demonstrations, exposing the alleged evils of Catholicism and Mohammedanism, serving
to further increase the cultural distance between the Balkan communities.
The Yugoslav People's Army (Gray)
Formerly the protector of Yugoslavia as a whole —not particular nationalist
groups— the (gray-uniformed) pre-Milosevic Yugoslav People's Army was considered
dogmatic, conservative and anti-democratic. However, through favorable press coverage
and political nurturing, and with an overwhelming number of Serbian officers, the army
eventually became the fighting arm of Serbian nationalism; and it was under the direct
control of Milosevic at the outbreak of hostilities with Croatia in 1991.
In the Wake of Milosevic's "Greater Serbia"
The international community has witnessed the ruthless and violent conflict within
the former Yugoslavia during the past several years. Several questions come to mind:
7Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia - The Policy of "Ethnic Cleansing, p. 32.
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How effectively has Milosevic been able to move toward his "Greater Serbia"? What was
the Serbian strategy for regaining (or acquiring) Serbian territory? Is this action really
"genocide", or a legitimate attempt to liberate the Serbian people throughout Yugoslavia?
In March 1989, the CIA concluded an assessment of "atrocities" which had been
committed in Bosnia. The report concludes that:
"90 percent of the acts of "ethnic cleansing" were carried out by Serbs (and)
leading Serbian politicians almost certainly played a role in the crimes... in a
systematic attempt to eliminate all traces of other ethnic groups from their
territory... the systematic nature of the Serbian actions strongly suggest that
Pale and perhaps Belgrade exercised a carefully veiled role in the purposeful
destruction and dispersal of non-Serb populations... it makes clear with
concrete evidence that there was a conscious, coherent and systematic
Serbian policy to get rid of Muslims, through murders torture and
imprisonment... a premeditated attack on Bosnia's Muslim population...
particularly intense in the towns of Prijedor, Banja Luka, Zvornik, Bijeljina,
Vlasenica, Foca and Trebinje... with an intensity, sustained orchestration and
scale... which pales to the alleged atrocities committed by the Croatian and
Bosnian forces."8
What might be done to stem future ethnic violence? Clearly, the international
community must remain vigilant, recognize the early warning signs of pending regional
catastrophe, and act early and decisively with diplomatic, economic, and even military
force to curtail the violence. Moreover, an intensive "information campaign", directed at
the Serbian people might have precluded the violence.
The lessons from the Yugoslav conflict, especially regarding hyper-nationalist
manipulation by empowered elites, must not be soon forgotten.
8Roger Cohen, "CIA Report on Bosnia Blames Serbs for 90% of the War Crimes", New




c --is pronounced 'ts' as in mats or tsar
c —is 'ten' (hard) as in chore, archer or match
c —is 'tj' (soft) as in the 't' sound in tune or future; often found at the end of
proper names.
dj —is 'dg' as in bridge, jet oxjeans; the pronunciation of 'dz' is almost identical
h —is guttural, as in the Scottish loch
j —is 'y' as in yes or Yugoslavia
Ij —is 'liyuh' like the middle sound ofmillion
nj —is 'ny' like canyon, or new
s —is 'sh' like shore or sharp
z —is 'zh' like leisure, pleasure or Zhivago
All vowels are short. Other letters are pronounced as in English. Shorter words are
stressed on the first syllable, and longer words are usually stressed on the third syllable




"For scholars, Bosnia is an analytical nightmare of conflicting historical
claims, political agendas, and strategic ambitions; not surprisingly,
differences among interpretations are legion." 1
"Of course, I assure everyone that Serbia will not in any way abuse its
numerical size nor endanger anyone in [any] way." —Slobodan Milosevic,
19902
"I believe that Greater Serbia [Velika Srbija] —or Serbia, as the state
belonging to the Serbian people and encompassing all our cultural and
ethnic space— is close to the heart of every Serb." —Radovan Karadzic,
1991 3
In January 1993, President William Clinton described the Balkan conflict as "the
most frustrating and complex foreign policy issue in the world today." Secretary of State
Warren Christopher has claimed that it is the "problem from hell".4 Zbigniew Brzezinski,
former National Security Advisor to President Carter, describes the conflict as "a moral and
political calamity of historic proportions" and expresses alarm at this ongoing "European"
debacle. 5 Even today, as commentators and pundits debate the "slippery slope" of the
Balkans, the world continues to discover that there are no easy answers to the Yugoslav
question.
'Robin Allison Remington, "Bosnia: The Tangled Web," Current History, p. 364, November
1993.
President Milosevic at the January 21,1 990, session ofthe LCY Commission for the Reform
of the Political System, cited from Sabrina P. Ramet's, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia,
1962-1991, 2nd Edition, p. 225, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1992.
interview with Radovan Karadzic by Dada Vujasinovic, "Drzava koja se razmnozava" (A
State Which Is Multiplying Itself), Duga, (Belgrade), p. 19, 26 October- 10 November 1991.
4Paul Lewis, "U.S. Seeks Tougher Sanctions," New York Times, p. A15, 7 April 1993.
5Zbigniew Brzezinski, "After Srebrenica," The New Republic, p. 20, 7 August, 1995.
1
Under Yugoslavian President Josip Broz Tito it was said that that the Balkan state
consisted of seven neighbors, six republics, five nations, four languages, three religions, two
alphabets and one country. The region is indeed historically, culturally and politically
complex. Since the violence began in June of 1991, over 250,000 Yugoslavs have been
killed and perhaps as many as 2.3 million may have been displaced from their homes; and,
as this thesis will note, the world has stood idle throughout most of the premeditated and
systematic "ethnic cleansing" of an entire culture.
The peacekeeping effort within the former Yugoslavia has been substantial. The UN
force on the ground in Bosnia —approximately 22,500 men and women (UNPROFOR,
UNHCR, UNMO)-- was the largest deployment since the Korean war. NATO has
experienced its first out-of-area action during the extensive Operations "Deny Flight",
"Sharp Guard" and "Deliberate Force"; and with the current deployment of the NATO
"Implementation Forces" (IFOR), the prospects for long-term Western involvement in the
area are significant.
Yet, despite the presence of a potentially formidable international force in the area,
the world community has witnessed (via CNN) widespread and prolonged violations to
human rights; and the credibility, reputation and resolve of the leading international security
institutions (UN, EU, WEU, NATO, CSCE/OSCE) have collapsed at the feet of the
purported "New World Order". Today, even after the marathon negotiating sessions at
Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, the chances for a wider war remain
present; Macedonia, Albania, and even Greece and Turkey might easily be consumed in the
conflagration. Most significantly, throughout the conflict, in a series of "half-measures and
empty threats" from UN and NATO leaders, the West has lost essential credibility as a post
Cold-War world leader in an ever more dangerous international environment.
Although the U.S. has strong historical, political, economic, social, and cultural ties
to Europe —a majority ofAmericans claim European ancestry or ethnic origin. 6 The Balkan
6In the 1990 census, 57% of the total population indicated European ancestries. Institute for
National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment J 995, p. 40, Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1995.
conflict has divided and frustrated a bevy of American politicians, diplomats and warriors;
and as we continue to experience accelerated regional conflict throughout the world, the
lessons of the Balkan debacle should be carefully analyzed and not repeated. This thesis will
specifically examine the origins of this bewildering conflict.

II. METHODOLOGY
The nature of the ongoing Balkan conflict presents the researcher with several
significant challenges. The great libraries of Sarajevo are demolished, most reliable native
scholars have been effectively silenced or corrupted, and travel in-country is still limited for
obvious reasons. In addition, the accurate information which does leak out is often written
in Serbo-Croat —the main Yugoslav language— and one is often constrained by rough
translations or summaries of critical documents. Most primary source literature
disseminated by the Serbian Ministry of Information —written in English to facilitate
Western consumption— is, as this thesis will demonstrate, simply Serbian propaganda and
disinformation. The publications available commercially to the fledgling Western researcher
contain a wide assortment of material, some extremely well researched and compelling, but
most from dubious sources containing inaccurate, skewed and highly subjective
interpretations.
Given these constraints, this thesis, a qualitative historical analysis of domestic
Serbian political development during the late 1980's and early 1990's, is based on primary
and secondary source documents and interviews: books, periodicals and scholarly journals
on current events and Balkan history; UN Security Council Resolutions, reports and
documents; NATO Communiques; daily newspapers and press releases; and U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) publications.
The notes and bibliography contain most of the premier resources available on
Yugoslavia today, and the author wishes to specially thank two "Yugo-professionals",
Professors Norman Cigar and Sabrina P. Ramet for their advice and encouragement. Some
ofthe other outstanding authors include: Laura Silber, Christopher Bennett, V.P Gagnon, Jr.,
Steven Van Evera, Aleksa Djilas, Noel Malcolm, Roy Gutman, David Rieff, Mark Almond,
Albert Wohlstetter, and Roger Cohen from the New York Times.
Also, although recent literature seems to indicate that in-country Balkan experience
produces bizarre biases depending upon assignment and location, the author will claim 3
months of personal experience as a member of NATO's Bosnian "Deny Flight" strike
planning staff at Vicenza, Italy, in May-July of 1994. Lastly, special thanks to the
level-headed professionals within the National Security Affairs Department at the U.S. Naval
Postgraduate School —particularly Professors Cynthia Levy, Frank Teti, and David Yost—
for patiently allowing this A-6 Bombardier to wander the labyrinthine corridors of Yugoslav
politics.
III. PURPOSE
For the past several years, the world has been bombarded and bewildered by myriad
interpretations and analyses concerning the Balkan violence. Clearly the bloodiest war in
Europe since WWII, the ongoing conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina has destroyed the Yugoslav
state, leveled entire cities, and resulted in over 250,000 casualties and millions of Yugoslavs
displaced and homeless. Various experts, intellectuals and statesmen have described the
conflict as an ancient civil war between backward and far-off clans; and the international
community continues to express alarm at this European "Backyard War" raging in the region
between Italy and Greece. Others claim that the war, a conflict among morally equivalent
tribes, is too complex for outsiders to understand or resolve —the locals (so the logic goes)
have, after all, been fighting for thousands of years, and the Serbs fought on the side of the
Western Allies during WWII!
What is the root cause of violent conflict throughout this culturally diverse and
historically multi-ethnic region of Europe? Is there a logical explanation, a central event ~a
spark— which caused friends, neighbors and even families to take up arms against each other
after 3 generations of multi-cultural coexistence? Are there adequate explanations for the
ethnic implosion and systematic murder ofthe cosmopolitan culture of Sarajevo —site of the
1 984 Winter Olympics, and before the war, a shining example of multi-ethnic, intermarried
and religiously mixed culture— a Balkan ideology that had stood against the division of its
people into segregated groups for almost 50 years?
T.D. Allman offers us a glimpse of the region before the violence began:
"Yugoslavia had tourism, heavy industry; it was a food-surplus
nation. Its new freeways linked the rest of the European
Community with Greece, Turkey, and the export markets of the
Middle East. The totems of an emerging consumer society were
everywhere: new gas stations, motels, housing developments, and
discos and sidewalk cafes in the villages. Most impressive were
the large private houses covering the roadside hills. Before the
killing started practically everybody, it seems, was just finishing
a new house, or had just bought a new car." 7
What, then, really happened to all of this? Confusion as to the nature and origins of
the ongoing Balkan violence has been widespread, to say the least. This thesis will argue
that the conflict is not one of ancient ethnic sentiments or of "civil war" between "traditional
tribal rivals" —fighting for "hundreds of years"-- nor is it one of external (international)
security concerns. It is rather the direct result of within-group (intra-state/inter-cultural)
conflict. It is the result ofa rational program of domestic conflict waged along ethno-cultural
lines by a threatened powerful elite; an elite which embraced and subsequently nurtured a
budding nationalist movement, deliberately and systematically manipulating and provoking
it to create ethnic and cultural cleavages within the region. The thesis will demonstrate that
the violence witnessed by the international community can be traced to the destructive
strategies adopted by a status-quo elite for political survival. Furthermore, this threatened
leadership rationally initiated a "grand strategy" of culturally re-coding its own society in
order to emphasize ethno-nationalism as the only politically relevant identity; with potential
political rivals depicted as dangerous threats to the very existence of the nation. 8
More specifically, the Serbian leadership, beginning in 1987, intentionally created
(rather than responded to) threats to the "Serbian nation" by purposefully provoking and
fostering the outbreak of violent nationalist conflict along ethno-cultural lines —even (and
especially) in areas with histories of inter-marriage and positive inter-ethnic relations. 9
7T.D. Allman; Quoted by Christopher Bennett in: Yugoslavia 's Bloody Collapse - Causes,
Course and Consequences, p. 1, NY University Press, New York, 1995.
8For a particularly germane analysis of the Serbian domestic political situation see: V.P.
Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International
Security, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 130-166, Winter 1994/95 .
9The phenomenon of "Serbian Nationalism" will be examined vis-a-vis the definitions
suggested by Steven Van Evera in his paper, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International
Security, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 5-39, Spring 1994 .
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The beginning of the current Balkan conflict can be traced to the post-Tito struggle
for power in the face of democratic political and liberal economic reform. Primary
responsibility for the tragic deterioration falls squarely on the shoulders of the Serbian
President, Slobodan Milosevic —and his quest for power within the domestic Yugoslav
political arena.
To retain and rebuild his waning political influence, Milosevic embraced a
particularly violent strain of Serbian nationalism, created an external threat to the Serbian
nation, —essentially all "non-Serbs" throughout Yugoslavia— united his terrified people
around him in a common fight for survival, and based his domestic and foreign policies on
overcoming this fabricated threat.
Far from an inevitable and "spontaneous tribal combustion" of ethnic hatreds, the
conflict began as a coldly premeditated, systematic, and violent power drive by Milosevic,
fueled by hyper-nationalism-turned-xenophobia. "Ethnic cleansing" became the primary
means by which Milosevic continues to seek dominance of an ethnically (and politically)
homogenous "Greater Serbia".
10
IV. SERBIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE
A. CULTURE
Webster's International Dictionary describes culture as "the body of customary
beliefs, social forms, and material traits constituting a distinct complex of tradition of racial
(ethnic), religious, or social group". 10 One might also define it as collectively held
semi-conscious or unconscious images, assumptions, "codes", and "scripts" which define the
external environment. These codes, images and scripts enable a group to "cope with its
problems of external adaptation and internal integration." 11 Clifford Geertz proposes that
"cultural assumptions constitute a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic
forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about
and attitudes towards life". 12
Aleksa Djilas explains that within the mixture of South Slavs (Yugoslavs) which
comprised the former Yugoslavia:
"The various groups also had separate national ideologies (or cultures) based
on collective historical memories and state traditions, some going back to
medieval times, that were often mixed with legends and myths. Like
elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe there was a strong tendency to
glorify one's own group as heroic and creative and to see others in
stereotypes of cowardice and backwardness." 13
Sebastian Green further states that "dominant subcultures can impose cultural forms
on other groups, manipulate them, or convince other subcultures that these dominant cultural
10 Webster's Third International Dictionary, p. 552, Merriam-Webster, Springfield, MA,
1986.
1
'Johnston, Alastair Iain, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," International Security, vol.
19, no. 4, p. 44, Spring 1995.
12Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation ofCultures, p. 89, Basic Books, New York, 1973.
13Aleksa Djilas, "Yugoslavia's Trap of Ethnic Confrontation," New York Times, 7 July 1991.
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forms are in fact their own forms. In this sense, cultural forms can be designed to preempt
challenges to the status quo". 14
B. STRATEGIC CULTURE
Geertz further describes "strategic culture" as "an integrated system of symbols (e.g.,
argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive
and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of
military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an
aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious." 15
Although this definition applies primarily to "interstate" scenarios, it might also serve
to describe inter-ethnic affairs within a polity, particularly during periods of significant
political conflict. Furthermore, although strategic culture implies consistent and unique
long-term behavior by a given state, this is not to say that it is not immutable or vulnerable
to manipulation.
C. THE SERBIAN CASE
Based on the above definitions of "culture" and "strategic culture", the question arises
as to whether the conflict in Yugoslavia is indeed grounded on a long tradition of Slavic
inter-cultural rivalry, or rather, it is the result of a conscious effort by an entrenched
status-quo elite to preserve and enhance its political hegemony through the manipulation of
the efficacy of war? Or both....
Serbian strategic culture did not (initially) provide the catalyst for disaster. In an
effort to overcome competing strategic tendencies (post-Tito domestic political and
economic reform), and to maintain a hegemonic power-base within the former Yugoslavia,
the state rationally manipulated the Serbian culture, and indeed altered the strategic culture,
to garner political legitimacy and popular support. By invoking the ghosts and myths of
14Sebastian Green, International Studies ofManagement and Organization, p. 19, vol. 18,
no. 2, 1988.
15Johnson, p. 46 (Emphasis added).
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history and tradition, the status-quo regime sought to rally popular support and deflect
popular pressure for reform. After almost 35 years of peaceful multi-cultural and
multi-ethnic coexistence within Yugoslavia, the Serbian state unleashed a devastating
"nationalist genie"; tapping and amplifying long dormant cultural episodes, myths and
threats. Through careful media manipulation, the political and intellectual discourse
essentially re-wove the very fabric of Serbian strategic culture. Indeed, as Alastair Johnston
notes, the Serbian strategic culture was consciously manipulated "to justify the competence
of decision-makers, deflect criticism, suppress dissent, and limit access to the decision
process." 16
The transformation from multi-cultural Yugoslavia to exclusivist "Greater Serbia"
was both significant and destructive as an entirely new (yet mythologically ancient) system
of cultural "symbols" was promulgated and absorbed. War, as a state of human affairs was
depicted as inevitable; with a readily identifiable enemy (all non-Serbs); and an imminent
threat posed by an insidious and almost inhuman adversary (Muslims and Catholics).
Furthermore, the struggle was presented as a "zero-sum" situation; victory or death of the
Serbian nation. Facing this new "clear and present danger" of cultural extermination, the
regime portrayed the sole defense available to a besieged people as violent and unmerciful
force; only through the annihilation of these inhuman aggressors would Serbia survive. The
Belgrade regime, by painting this grave threat to Serbians throughout Yugoslavia, thus
deflected demands for radical political and economic change and ensured its own survival
within this atmosphere of Balkan anarchy.
But what of the deeper motives? The regime's declaratory strategy, cultural
prosperity within a new nationalistic "Greater Serbia", became the cloak for a much more
sinister and politically pragmatic operational strategy of political dominance; featuring the
ruthless extermination of potential political rivals. Through the use of symbols and an
"official language" of political discourse which excluded alternative strategies, the Serbian
regime undermined challenges to its authority, mobilized support and otherwise upheld
16Johnston, p.38.
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hegemony in the decision process... they were recognized as (the only) competent and
legitimate authorities within a framework of apocalyptic collapse. 17
The deployment of an offensive "strategic culture" instrumentally served the regime
in its quest for political hegemony, essentially legitimizing the authority and justifying the
violent actions of those in power. Yet, this cultural juggernaut, once unleashed, began to
prove incompatible with the political "game" rationality of the entrenched elite, and assumed
a life of its own. Indeed, once the Serbian regime had expediently tapped the wellspring of
mythological and historical tradition, the flow became unresponsive and even uncontrollable.
The need for flexibility and adaptation within the evolving political arena of the former
Yugoslavia was constrained by a monolithic and very dangerous hyper-nationalist society,
populated with culturally re-coded Serbian Frankensteins (the Bosnian Serbs), and bound
together by destructive myth.
The question has recently arisen as to whether the Serbian political elite can escape
or control the newly re-awakened symbolic discourse —the cultural bulwarks which they
themselves erected and nurtured. Perhaps a dialectic evolution of strategic culture does
occur, but in this case, as we shall see, the violence and destruction, once unleashed, proved
almost unstoppable even for the masters.
''Paraphrased and adapted to the "Serbian Case" from Johnston, p. 57, who cited Pierre
Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, pp. 41-65, Polity, Cambridge, UK, 1991.
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V. BALKAN MYTHS
The Balkan arena indeed has a rich and culturally complex past. 18 Yet, despite these
deep historical and cultural roots —this "thousand year old history"-- modern political
struggle and survival is at the heart of the current conflict. As Ivo Banac points out:
"The current conflict among the South Slavs, specifically between the Serbs
and the Croats, is not ancient, unless the term ancient encompasses the end
of the nineteenth century, and it is not religious, although religion has played
a part in the encounter. The current conflict is primarily ideological and
political." 19
V.P. Gagnon further states that:
"A common explanation for violent conflict along ethnic lines, particularly
for the Yugoslav case, is that ancient ethnic hatreds have burst to the surface.
But this is unsupported by the evidence: in fact, Yugoslavia never saw the
kind of religious wars seen in Western and Central Europe, and Serbs and
Croats never fought before this century; intermarriage rates were quite high
in those ethnically-mixed regions that saw the worst violence; and
sociological polling as late as 1 989-90 showed high levels of tolerance,
especially in these mixed regions. Although some tensions existed between
nationalities and republics, and the forcible repression of overt national
sentiment added to the perception on all sides that the existing economic and
political system was unjust, the evidence indicates that, notwithstanding
claims to the contrary by nationalist politicians and historians in Serbia and
Croatia, 'ethnic hatreds' are not the essential, primary cause of the Yugoslav
conflict."20
In June of 1991 , as the international community watched aghast on CNN, the Serbian
regime in Belgrade began to execute a coldly premeditated, systematic, and violent campaign
18Two recent outstanding histories Yugoslavia are: Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine Jr.,
Bosnia and Herzegovina - A Tradition Betrayed, Columbia University Press, New York, 1994; and
Noel Malcolm, Bosnia - A Short History, New York University Press, 1994.
19Ivo Banac, "The Fearful Asymmetry of War: The Causes and Consequences of
Yugoslavia's Demise", Daedalus, p. 141, Spring 1992.
20V.P. Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia",
International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, p. 134, Winter 1994/95.
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of terror. Fueled by vehement nationalism, the Serbian President —firmly in control of the
Yugoslav People's Army (JNA)— initiated a ruthless program of "ethnic cleansing"
throughout Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina with the intent of establishing himself as the
leader of a culturally and politically homogenous "Greater Serbia".
Although the Croatian and Bosnian government forces have carried out ruthless
campaigns against the Serbian diaspora throughout the former Yugoslavia, these policies
must be seen in the context of the Serbian strategy; essentially backlash responses to the
ruthless and violent spread of ethnic nationalism from Belgrade. An understanding the
Serbian "Grand Strategy", which was launched as early as 1987, is the key to unlocking the
contemporary Balkan puzzle.
By 1993, the State Department's annual report to the Congress on human rights
stressed that:
"The atrocities of the Croats and Bosnian Muslims pale in comparison to the
sheer scale and calculated cruelty of the killings and other abuses committed
by Serbian and Bosnian Serbian forces against Bosnian Muslims. The policy
of driving out innocent civilians of a different ethnic or religious group from
their homes, so-called "ethnic cleansing", was practiced by Serbian forces in
Bosnia on a scale that dwarfs anything seen in Europe since Nazi times."21
21Albert Wohlstetter, "Bosnia as Future". Incorporated as chapter 5 of: RAND Conference
Proceedings; Lessonsfrom Bosnia, CF-1 13-AF, p. 28, RAND, Santa Monica, 1993.
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VI. CATALYST FOR CRISIS
At the heart of this ideological, cultural and political turmoil stands Serbian President
Slobodan Milosevic. As chief functionary of the declining Yugoslav Communist regime,
Milosevic essentially hijacked and became the voice of Serbian hyper-nationalism; adopting
a "grand strategy" which included the cultural re-coding and manipulation of his society in
order to emphasize ethno-nationalism as the only politically relevant identity; depicting
potential political rivals (all "non-Serbs"; but especially the Bosnian Muslims) as dangerous
threats to the very existence of all Serbs and Serbia.
Slobodan Milosevic represents a powerful synthesis or, more precisely "symbiosis"22
,
of Yugoslav Communism (political conservatism, support for centralism, and resistance to
meaningful change); Serbian nationalism (desire for a sovereign "Greater Serbia"); Serbian
Christian Orthodoxy; and the powerful Yugoslav People's Army (YPA/JNA) -and his
personal management of this symbiosis continues to profoundly affect developments within
the former Yugoslavia.
Warren Zimmerman describes Milosevic as "the slickest con man in the Balkans". 23
Others have commented that he is a "consummate tactician, political chameleon, master of
the bob and weave and, for all that, the key player on the Balkan scene..."24 This author
might add: ruthless opportunist and violent destabilizer of the Yugoslav Federation, whose
cry of "strong Serbia, strong Yugoslavia" has ripped the region into a patchwork of
shell-shocked Southern Slavs.
Milosevic, the great promoter of Serbian nationalism, began in 1987 to deliberately
fan the psychological flames of the Serbian masses for personal aggrandizement. By
22As described by Professor Norman Cigar, in his excellent book, Genocide in Bosnia - The
Policy of "Ethnic Cleansing, " Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 1995.
23Warren Zimmerman, "The Last Ambassador," Foreign Affairs, pp. 2-20, March/April 1 995
.
24Karsten Prager, "Milosevic Plays Peacekeeper," Time Magazine, vol. 146, no. 3, 17 July
1993.
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co-opting this powerful genie called nationalism (or loyalty to the nation) into the service of
the state, and more precisely, into his personal vehicle for self-preservation and political
power, he unleashed a formidable force which may not soon be stopped, especially among
the Bosnian Serbs in the Sarajevo and Pale regions.
Christopher Bennett says of Milosevic
"Relatively little is known about the man himself... He was careful to keep
as low a profile as possible... He only granted media interviews when
absolutely necessary, and always stuck to a carefully rehearsed script. Serbian
analysts who have followed Milosevic's career closely (and written very little
about it in English) insist he (is) not a nationalist, but that he (is) ruthlessly
ambitious and prepared to use and abuse anybody and any ideology to fuel
that ambition. His driving force was an overwhelming lust for power, not
visions of a Greater Serbia, and for that reason he was far more dangerous."25
If the root of all conflict is, as Thucydides claimed, either fear, interest or honor,
Milosevic has chosen fear:
Milosevic seems to have allied himself permanently with the politics of fear.
He thrives on it and is always on the lookout for the hostility and conflict that
produce it. This is one of the deeper causes of the Yugoslav civil war:
Milosevic counted on war, the ultimate condition of fear, to unite Serbs
around him. That is why he refused to look for political solutions to the
persecution of Serbs in Croatia after Franjo Tudjman came to power in May
1990, and to the erosion of the Serbs' position in Bosnia Herzegovina, after
the Muslim leader Alifa Izetbegovic became its president in November 1990.
Milosevic welcomed the Serbs' increased sense of insecurity and was only
too glad to plunge them into a war in which they would have only him for
protection."26
25Bennett, Christopher, Yugoslavia 's Bloody Collapse - Causes, Course and Consequences,
p. 83, New York University Press, New York, 1995.
26Aleksa Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic," Foreign Affairs, p. 88, Summer 1993.
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VII. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MILOSEVIC
Slobodan Milosevic was born on the 29th of August, 1941, in the Serbian town of
Pozarevac —about 50 miles from Belgrade; population 20,000— to an Orthodox Christian
family of Montenegrin descent. 27 His father, Svetozar, studied Eastern Orthodox theology
and taught Russian and Serbo-Croatian language and literature at a local high school. He left
the family when "Slobo" was in elementary school, and committed suicide in 1962. His
mother, Stanislava, was a schoolteacher, a dedicated communist activist and a strict,
self-possessed woman who raised the children alone. She, too, committed suicide, in 1 973
.
Milosevic met his future wife Mirjana Markovic while attending high school in Pozarevac.
In 1964, Milosevic graduated from the University of Belgrade Law School, where he
had been active in party politics and might be best described as a prim loner —confident,
assured, and highly creative. By 1968 he had gained an executive position with state-owned
Technogas company, and became the close associate of Ivan Stambolic, whom he had met
during his first year at the Faculty ofLaw in Belgrade. Stambolic would remain Milosevic's
mentor, friend and associate until 1987, when, as chief political rivals, Milosevic would
ruthlessly force him from office and assume his position as Serbian President.
By 1969 Milosevid had joined the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY);
where he earned a reputation as a friendly, reliable and dynamic party apparatchik. By this
time Yugoslavia had fully embraced Titoist Communism; very moderate compared to that
in the Soviet and Eastern European countries, with a market-oriented economy, tolerant
cultural policies and travel opportunities open to the West.
27For profiles of Milosevic see: Sabrina P. Ramet, "Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic: A Profile,"
Orbis, p. 93, Winter 1991; and Ramet, "A New Napoleon: The Rise of Slobodan Milosevic," in
Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991, p. 225, Indiana University, Bloomington,
1992; Aleksa Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic," Foreign Affairs, p. 81, Summer 1993;
Steven Burg, "Why Yugoslavia Fell Apart," Current History, p. 357, November 1993; V.P. Gagnon,
Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict - The Case of Serbia," International Security,
p. 146, Winter 1994/95; and Warren Zimmerman, "Origins of a Catastrophe - Memoirs of the Last
American Ambassador to Yugoslavia," Foreign Affairs, p. 2, March/April 1995.
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However, in the early 1970's, in an attempt to preserve the status-quo, Marshal Josip
Broz Tito began purges of all Serbian reform-minded communists. These "liberals" were
in favor of liberal market forces, freedom of speech and European-style parliamentary
democracy. They also believed that the party should withdraw from the realm of arts and
culture, and should promote young and able people to leading positions. From this point,
Tito began to increase political repression and strengthened the party's hold over the
economy, which continued to deteriorate.
Membership in the party was limited to those who exhibited a dogmatic adherence
to Marxism-Leninism --"Moral-political suitability"-- and this became the prerequisite for
successful careers in business, the media, education and politics. Throughout this period,
Milosevic, the pragmatic opportunist, not only survived the purges, but in fact excelled as
a doctrinaire communist.
By 1973 he had become director-general of Technogas, a state-owned enterprise, and
began a long climb through the bureaucracy of Yugoslav politics. In 1978 he was appointed
President of Beobanka (Belgrade Bank), a highly visible position, and often commuted
between Belgrade and New York. Ambassador Zimmerman describes the influences of this
experience:
"Milosevic knows how to act with Americans. He dresses in the Western
Style (he spent considerable time in New York in his banking days), drinks
scotch on the rocks and smokes Italian cigarillos. His cherubic cheeks do not
fit the strongman image... he has to work hard at looking tough for his public
posters... his manner displays his light side... unfortunately, the man is
almost totally dominated by his dark side". 28
Milosevic was 38 years old when Tito died in 1980. After the death, he continued to
consistently and convincingly defend Tito's legacy, remaining an uncompromising
doctrinaire communist.
In April of 1984, his old friend and mentor Ivan Stambolic became chairman of the
Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia (LCS). Stambolic appointed
Milosevic, at age 43, as the head of the Belgrade party committee —to battle: the rising waves
28Zimmermann, "The Last Ambassador," p. 4.
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of"anti-Communist reactionaries"; bourgeois liberalism (the gravest threat to the communist
power monopoly); and Great Serbian nationalism, a threat to both Serbian and non-Serbian
communist regimes, especially the Albanians in Kosovo, the Slovenians and the Croatians.
Even members within Serbian party advocated change —a particularly grave threat to both
Stambolic and Milosevic
"In the early 1980's...Members of the Serbian party leadership called for
totally removing party influence at the local levels of the economy; for
greater reliance on private enterprise and individual initiative; multiple
candidates in state and party elections; free, secret elections in the party; and
recognition and adoption of 'all the positive achievements of bourgeois
civilization', i.e. liberal democracy". 29
Moreover, in 1985, a growing faction of Serbian nationalists began to express public
outrage at the mass exodus of Serbians and Montenegrins from Kosovo —the result of rioting
by the ethnic Albanians in that region. It was during this time that Milosevic made his
"entrance" as a credible politician, when he was invited to address the LCS's Central
Committee. With his popular personality, emotional and semi-nationalistic tones, Milosevic
was received well by the committee. Coincidentally, in 1985, the Serbian Academy of
Sciences and Arts (SANU) organized a commission of intellectuals to write a memorandum
on the current Yugoslav situation.
In May of 1986, Stambolic became the President of the Republic of Serbia, and in
his address to the 10th Congress of the Serbian Party, denounced the 1974 federal
constitution as contrary to the interests of Serbs; and (interestingly) warned of the dangers
of Serbian nationalism.
As Stambolic continued his political ascendency, Milosevic followed by becoming
chairman of the Central Committee ofthe LCS. Now chief of the Serbian Communist Party,
Milosevic appeared to be the embodiment of staunch communist party conservatism.
29V.P. Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia,'
International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, p. 145, Winter 1994/95.
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But, facing significant economic deterioration, growing political opposition, and
waning popular support, Milosevic began to search for allies —and was drawn even closer
to the ever-more- vocal Serbian nationalist movement.
A. THE DECISIVE MOMENT?
In April of 1987, Milosevic" attended a meeting of 300 party delegates of the LCY
(mostly ethnic Albanians) in Kosovo Polje, a suburb of Kosovo's capital city of Pristina.
The meeting had been open only to the Communist delegates, but some fifteen thousand
Serbs and Montenegrins attempted to force their way into the meeting hall. Albanian police
blocked the way and began to brutally disperse the crowd with clubs. Milosevic, seizing the
moment, raised his hands, stopped the chaos, and allowed the Serbians to enter the hall
—where he told the crowd; "Nobody, either now or later, has the right to beat you."30 This
incident and these words have earned Milosevic" a place in Serbian mythology, and represent
one of the decisive "sparks" which would ignite the Yugoslav conflagration. It was on this
day that Milosevic" publicly abandoned doctrinaire communism, threw his saddle on Serbian
nationalism and began the long, violent ride toward "Greater Serbia".
"After that night, suddenly there was a psychological change in him. All at once, he
discovered he had this power over people."31 Moved by the plight of the Kosovo Serbs, the
ex-communist bureaucrat had discovered the strength to step out in front and lead the Serbian
masses. By adopting his own brand of Serbian nationalism, Milosevic —ever the political
opportunist— transitioned from dogmatic communist to overt ideological eclectic. By the
end of April, 1987, Slobodan Milosevic" had fully donned the cape of all-powerful nationalist
leader and the new political arena was charged with Milosevic's brand of authoritarian and
exclusive Serbian nationalism.
30The Chicago Tribune, October 17, 1988.
31 The Washington Post, February 4, 1990.
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Although Milosevic displayed a genuine and deep sympathy for the plight of Serbs
in Kosovo and later throughout the Balkans, Ambassador Zimmerman has reservations about
the moral qualities of President Milosevic
"He is a man of extraordinary coldness. I never saw him moved by an
individual case of human suffering; for him, people are groups (Serbs,
Muslims) or simply abstractions. Nor did I ever hear him say a charitable or
generous word about any human being, not even a Serb. This chilling
personality trait made it possible for Milosevic to condone, encourage, and
even organize the unspeakable atrocities committed by Serbian citizens in the
Bosnian war. It also accounts for his habitual mendacity, as in his outrageous
distortion of Serbian behavior in Kosovo. For Milosevic, truth has only a
relative value. If it serves his objectives, it is employed; if not, it can be
discarded."32
After the events of April 1987, Milosevic" began a ruthless campaign to achieve
personal leadership of all Yugoslavia, and the manipulation of cultural symbols to incite
Serbian passions immediately became one of his principal political strategies. Journalists
who were sympathetic to (or indeed controlled by) Milosevic*, especially at the daily
newspaper Politika, began what was to become an intense and ongoing media campaign to
demonize ethnic Albanians (and later all non-Serbs) and to 'confirm' the allegations of
widespread genocide against the Serbs. 33 As Roger Cohen describes it:
"Having sensed his opportunity, Mr. Milosevic" moved fast. Medieval battles,
the relics of Serbian kings, the sacrifices of Serbian soldiers in two world
wars, the alleged injustices endured by Serbs in Tito's Yugoslavia, all
suddenly became grist for the nationalist mill. The motto of his
Communist-turned Socialist party was, 'Serbia does not kneel'."34
By September of 1987, he had arranged for the chief of the Belgrade Party
organization, Dragisa Pavlovic, to be dismissed; and in December, under direct attacks by
32Zimmermann, "The Last Ambassador," p. 5.
33V.P. Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia,"
International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, p. 147, Winter 1994/95.
34Roger Cohen, "Peace in the Balkans Now Relies on the Man Who Fanned Its Wars," New
York Times, p.A6, 31 October, 1995.
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the now Milosevic-controlled media, Ivan Stambolic, Milosevic's longtime friend (and a
defender of Pavlovic), was conveniently removed as Serbian President.
In May of 1989, two years after his Kosovo metamorphosis, the parliament of Serbia
elected Milosevid "President of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia".
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VIII. MILOSEVIC; SERBIAN PRESIDENT
Since 1987, Milosevic's goals have focused primarily on gaining full control of the
Serbian state (Serbia proper), and creating a unified country under Serbian domination
(Greater Serbia). With a semi-free market and a semi-democratic (ex-communist)
government under his personal tutelage, the initial drive consisted of reestablishing Serbian
control over the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo.
A. DISSOLUTION OF THE 1974 CONSTITUTION
As early as May of 1986, President Stambolic had denounced the 1974 Federal
Constitution as contrary to the interests of Serbs, and, after 1987, Milosevic wasted no time
in circumventing this document. Playing to Serbian pride, he began to criticize the policies
of former president Tito, and especially his 1 974 Constitution, for critically weakening
Serbia. As the last Yugoslav Constitution to be promulgated, it had effectively given
the 5 Yugoslav Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro and
Macedonia complete sovereignty over their territories, including the right to secession.
Within the Republic of Serbia, the 2 Provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina had their
own representatives in the federal, state and party bodies; and these delegates had historically
tended to vote mostly against Serbia, and, more significantly, against the Milosevic regime.
The Serbs, after 1974, had always believed that they had been singled out for unfair
treatment by Tito; and in fact the Constitution had largely separated Kosovo and Vojvodina
from Serbia.
Serbia's autonomous province ofKosovo is claimed by the Serbs to be "the real jewel
in the Serbian crown", the heartland of the medieval Serbian kingdom and the site of the
(mythologically) important 1389 Battle of Kosovo. Since the late 1960's Serbs have been
emigrating from this predominantly Albanian province (Serbs historically made up only 10
percent of the population), and by the mid-1980's, between 200,000 and 300,000 Serbs had
been forced out, mostly by Albanian extremists --providing an inter-ethnic tinderbox of
tension and strained relations, and fuel for Serbian nationalist agitation from Belgrade.
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In 1 987, Milosevic began to call publicly via mass rallies, speeches and interviews
for not only the protection of all Serbs in Kosovo, but the physical suppression of the
separatist Albanians. In 1988, a Committee for the Protection of Kosovo Serbs and
Montenegrins was established. As Committee Chairman Miroslav Ransovic put it; "If we
don't get our rights, we will take up arms". 35
And "take up arms" they did. The Kosovo Albanian separatist movement was
brutally suppressed, and behind the rallying cry of "Strong Serbia, strong Yugoslavia", the
Serbian regime in Belgrade aimed their nationalist flame-thrower on the Serbian Republic
of Vojvodina.
Sabrina P. Ramet sums it up nicely:
On 6 October (1988), Milosevic mobilized some one hundred thousand
supporters on the streets ofNovi Sad, and the entire leadership of Vojvodina
resigned, including provincial party leader Milovan Sogorov and provincial
president Nandor Major. Further resignations were tendered in the cities and
local communities of Vojvodina... In their places, Milosevic installed his
own people..."36
By February of 1989, Milosevic had succeeded in eliminating the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing autonomy to Kosovo and Vojvodina and reincorporated them into
Serbia. In 1990, the Federal Yugoslav Army, on Milosevic's orders, occupied Kosovo,
establishing a precedent which would be repeated again on June 27, 1991, when Yugoslav
Army tanks invaded independent Slovenia —effectively demolishing the modern country of
Yugoslavia.
B. CULT OF PERSONALITY
The personal popularity of President Milosevic blossomed quickly throughout Serbia
after 1987. Through his newly found populist-charismatic style, his direct appeal to the
masses, careful manipulation of crowds and tight control of the media, Milosevic began to
35
Profil, October 24, 1988.
36Sabrina P. Ramet, "Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic: A profile," Orbis, vol. 35, no. 1, p 98,
Winter 1991.
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cultivate his image as a virtual nationalist icon with promises to return Serbia to its rightful
place in the sun.
Playing to the Serbian sense of "machismo" and respect for physical strength,
"Comrade Slobo" began to boast of his "strong arm rule" (cvrsta ruka) with which he would
"protect" ethnic Serbs in not only in the autonomous province of Kosovo, but in Croatia and
Bosnia as well. 37 Shops and restaurants began to display his picture in the front windows,
and his icon suddenly appeared in Serbian Orthodox Churches throughout the country.
Budimir Kostic, president of the Serbian Investment Bank, enthusiastically explains that,
"Milosevic had (in mid- 1989) full support in Serbia, from the peasants to the Academy of
Science. He'd get 90 per cent of the vote in any election!"38 Alexander Zigic, a journalist at
Belgrade radio, reported in 1988 that Milosevic was a Serbian hero: "The crowds shout
'Slobodan, we love you!' --They see him as a savior!"39
C. CONTROL OF THE PRESS
The primary means by which Milosevic has successfully achieved his goal has been
through a carefully orchestrated and highly sophisticated Serbian media propaganda
campaign —newspapers, radio, and most importantly, Serbian TV. The following passage
offers a glimpse of the extensive Serbian press manipulations and disinformation strategies
aimed at the population.
"By far, TV has been the most essential medium in the Greater Serbia push.
'The war would be impossible without TV,' says Vesna Pesic, leader of a
Belgrade opposition party. Serbia is 35 percent illiterate, and TV is gospel in
the countryside, but even many educated Serbs are devotees. A young
medical student complains that his mother, a biochemist, has been following
the TV news each night with a map, 'marking where the Serbs have gained
37The New York Times, October 14, 1988.
38The New York Times, August 6, 1989.
39William Echikson, The Christian Science Monitor, 13 October, 1988.
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territory and screaming whenever Serbs are shot at. My dad and I can't
believe it. Its like they stole my mother." 40
Sabrina Ramet describes how Milosevic, from the very earliest stages of his program,
was able to seize control of 95 percent of the Serbian press:
"To establish power in Serbia, Milosevic thought he needed a pliant press.
He therefore fired a number of editors and journalists at the prestigious
Politika publishing house, and the daily papers Politika and Politika ekspres
as well as the weekly magazines Duga and NIN became mere mouthpieces
for Milosevic's policies... Publications appeared which were the direct result
of Milosevic's nationalist policies... in 1987 a book was published which
attempted to link the Vatican with the misdeeds of the fascist Ustase of
World War II —clearly an attempt to undermine the Catholic Church, the
cultural champion of the Serbs' arch-rivals, the Croats."41
Furthermore, although a small team of international journalists (Gutman, Reiff,
Cohen, et al.) were able to provide ongoing coverage of the Balkan implosion to viewers in
the West, the people within Serbia were essentially cut off from all timely and accurate news
sources (CNN, BBC, etc.) The Wall Street Journal describes Milosevic's tight control of the
Serbian media:
"Incredible as it might seem to us (the West) who are bombarded daily with
horrific images of the savagery in Bosnia, few Serbs are aware of what is
going on there. Milosevic's control of the local media, plus the West's
economic embargo, mean that accurate information doesn't reach Belgrade"42
Through his virtual monopoly and careful manipulation of all news sources,
Milosevic was able to consistently broadcast a steady stream of unnerving propaganda to the
more than 500,000 satellite dishes throughout Serbia and Montenegro. Mihajlo Mihajlov
reported from Belgrade that,
"If one did not read the newspapers or watch the news on television, one
would have the impression that there is little likelihood of a civil war
40Robert Marquand, The Christian Science Monitor, 26 January, 1993 (Emphasis added).
41Ramet, "Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic: A Profile", p. 97.
42
"Beyond Bosnia," Wall Street Journal, p. A 10, 6 May 1993.
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breaking out... If you read the Yugoslav newspapers, you get the impression
that a civil war has already started."43
In the words ofMilos Vasic, an editor ofthe independent Belgrade newspaper Vreme,
the conflict has been "an artificial war, really, produced by television. All it took was a few
years of fierce, reckless, chauvinist, intolerant, expansionist, warmongering propaganda to
create enough hate to start the fighting... Imagine a United States with every little TV station
everywhere taking the same editorial line ~a line dictated by David Duke. You, too, would
have war in five years."44
In a section of their book, War and Anti-War. Alvin and Heidi Toffler describe some
of the classic propaganda tools which have been used effectively throughout time to
galvanize various populations. As the Tofflers explain, "Each of these 'mind-wrenches' is
designed to exploit the mass media to sway mass emotion in mass societies."45 These "Six
Wrenches That Twist The Mind" are particularly germane to the description of the Serbian
Media.
1. The Atrocity Accusation
Atrocity stories have been a staple of the Serbian war propaganda, and whether true
or false, have indeed served the Belgrade media and inflamed popular emotion. In 1 992, for
example, after years of reporting "genocide" against Serbs in Kosovo, the Belgrade media
began to portray the peoples within Bosnia- Herzegovina as, "the ethnic enemy... the
fundamentalist-Muslim population of Bosnia, who were... seeking to impose an Islamic state
and to perpetrate genocide against the Bosnian Serbs". 46
1993.
43Mihajlo Mihajlov, "Back in Yugoslavia," The New Leader, pp. 7-8, 14 January, 1991.
'"Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War andAnti-War, p. 236, Little, Brown and Company, Boston,
45
Ibid.,p. 167.
46V.P. Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia,'
International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, p. 163, Winter 1994/95.
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Biljana Bakic explains how the Belgrade media machine dredged up memories of
past atrocities, and used them to further stoke the conflagration,
"Images were stressed which evoked the specter of the wartime Croatian
fascists, including prime-time television broadcasts of previously un-shown
graphic films from the Ustase concentration camps. The implication —and at
times explicit conclusions— of these and other such images was that Croats
as a people were 'genocidal'. 47
2. Hyperbolic Inflation of the Stakes Involved
Citizens were bombarded daily —through the newspapers and Television— with
urgent reports that everything which they held dear was in grave danger; the very survival
of the Serbian people, their culture, their lands, their children —certain disaster lurked
ominously just over the horizon. Christopher Bennett explains that, "The propaganda
offensive was so intense that ordinary Serbs rapidly came to believe that they were
permanently under siege and surrounded by blood enemies whose only desire was to wipe
them out."48
3. Demonization And/or Dehumanization of the Opponent
Professor Cigar offers that, "One element (in dehumanization) is the denigration of
out-groups either as subhuman or by metaphors of disease. There is a consensus that this
(type of defamation) provides moral license for general destruction."49
In Serbia, for example, not only was the nation in grave danger, but its "blood
enemies" were consistently depicted as inhuman monsters; a terrible Islamic fundamentalist
disease which had to be ruthlessly eradicated. In late 1991, an Orthodox cleric wrote of the
"malignant disease" of the "Fascist- fundamentalist Muslim community" which must be
either "cured or excised."
47Biljana Bakic, "The Role of the Media in the Yugoslav Wars," draft Master's Thesis,
University of Pittsburgh, Spring 1992.
48Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia 's Bloody Collapse - Causes, Course and Consequences,
p. 10, New York University Press, New York, 1995.
49Cigar,p.31.
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Gagnon explains that essentially all "non-Serbs" were targeted —and, to further
shatter the cultural foundation, even Tito himself was called into question—
"The strategy of consolidating control over the other republics through the
use of aggressive Serbian nationalism was accompanied by increasingly
vehement media demonization not only of Albanians, but of Croats; as well
as an active campaign to portray Tito's Yugoslavia as specifically
anti-Serbian". 50
Furthermore, the Serbs were depicted as helpless victims of various insidious
conspiracies. The following is typical of the Serbian sentiment after prolonged exposure to
the media:
"Every night, on the Belgrade news reports, the insatiable hordes of the
Muslim-Vatican conspiracy launch new attacks against Serbia. They commit
new outrages. And still the world does nothing —absolutely nothing!-- to help
the heroic Serb people in their heroic struggle against aggression."51
4. Polarization
As we will see later, the Serbian brand ofnationalism emphasized an exclusivist "us"
versus the rest philosophy --"those who are not Serbian are against us." This deliberate
polarization pitted all Serbs throughout the former Yugoslavia against all "non-Serbs",
producing a siege mentality with even civilized and educated people believing the
propaganda.
5. Divine Sanction
From the very early stages, Milosevic was able to fully co-opt and effectively place
the Serbian Orthodox Church into the service of the Belgrade propaganda machine. (See
section on the Serbian Orthodox Church).
6. Propaganda Discrediting the Opponent's Propaganda
The Tofflers offer a cogent description of this "wrench", explaining that "Meta-
propaganda is particularly potent because, instead of challenging the veracity of a single
50V.P. Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia,"
International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, p. 151, Winter 1994/95.
51T.D. Allman, "Serbia's Blood War", in Ali and Lifscultz, Why Bosnia?, p. 41.
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story, it calls into question everything coming from the enemy. Its aim is to produce
wholesale, as distinct from retail, disbelief'. 52
In fact, the pro-regime Belgrade media consistently went to great lengths to discredit
all contradictory information. The Economist offers an excellent example of both the Serbs'
total reliance on TV for their daily news, and the extent to which the media was carefully
controlled:
"The Socialists control the state television network. For the vast majority of
Serbs, it is their only source of information. It reports lovingly on Mr.
Milosevic's daily doings, accusing the independent press of being in the pay
of anti-Serb forces abroad."53
In July of 1995, President Milosevic spoke with several Western editors and bureau
chiefs in Belgrade. When asked about the use of rape in the Bosnian Serb detention camps
—which is now well documented— Milosevic replied:
"When we first heard via the foreign press that there were some detention
camps and rapes, our first reaction was, 'What about that?' The (Bosnian
Serb) leadership explained, 'It is absolutely not the truth, absolutely not.'
That was what was explained to us, and we then had a very deep confidence
in what they were explaining. And I believed that just because of habit. One
detail reported in the press: a Muslim girl who was pregnant by rape got
shelter in a hospital in Switzerland. An abortion was not possible, and when
the child was born, it happened to be Negro. No Serb was a Negro. Not
one".
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D. THE INTELLIGENTSIA (LEGITIMATION)
In concert with the media, the Serbian intelligentsia has played a leading part in the
intellectual and cultural "re-nationalization" of Serbia. As V.P. Gagnon says, "the peoples
of Yugoslavia had managed to live without overt violence for a generation, and convincing
52Toffler,p. 168.
""Milosevics Weimar Republic," The Economist, vol. 329, no. 7841, p. 59, 1 1 Dec. 1993.
54Karsten Prager, "I Am Just An Ordinary Man," Time, vol. 146, no. 3, July 17, 1995.
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present-day Serbs of the desirability of a Greater Serbia required a systematic and intensive
political and media campaign". 55
From the earliest stages of his drive, Milosevic controlled and manipulated the
Serbian intellectual community, specifically the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
(SANU). Considered by many to be the "spiritual standard-bearers" for Serbian nationalism,
members of SANU have untiringly published a number of inflammatory documents and
memorandums, and bear primary responsibility for the cynical and nihilistic brand of Serbian
nationalism generating mass self-pity, anger and hatred.
In May of 1985 the Serbian intelligentsia organized a commission to write a
memorandum on the current Yugoslav situation. The Serbian Memorandum, as it eventually
came to be known, was initially made public on 24 September, 1 986, and provided Milosevic"
with the strategic blueprint for the establishment of his "Greater Serbia".
"An ideological manifesto written by some members ofthe Serbian Academy
of Sciences and Arts in 1985, although claiming to call for democracy,
actually advocated the restoration of the repressive, centralized socialist
system that existed before the 1965 reforms. It sharply attacked the 1965
reforms as the root of all evil in Yugoslavia and as being aimed against
Serbs; declared Serbs in Kosovo and Croatia to be endangered; and
denounced the 'anti-Serb coalition' within Yugoslavia."56
The heart ofthis Manifesto claims that the "National Question" of the Serbian people
had been thwarted at the end of World War II, since the Serbs "did not get their own state
like other peoples". The only possible solution, it claims, is to bring about the territorial
unity of the Serbian people, to be achieved by ensuring that all the Serbs live in a single
55Gagnon, V.P. Jr.,"Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia"
International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 130-166, Winter 1994/95.
56Gagnon,p. 148.
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Serbian national state; Greater Serbia. 57 The Memorandum further states that Tito pursued
consistent discrimination against the Serbs and Serbian "Nation". 58
In 1 989, Milosevic stated that "As for the Serbian Academy of (Arts and) Sciences,
I do not see at all why it should not have influence over policy in Serbia" 59 ...and in fact,
many of the Serbian Intellectuals who drafted the Serbian Memorandum have become key
political figures under Milosevic.
"The text of the Serbian Memorandum has not been translated into English. It was first
published by the Belgrade Press and in Bozo Covic, ed., Izvori Velikosrpske agresije (The Sources
of Greater Serbian Aggression), Zagreb, Skolska Knjiga, 1991. Cigar recommends p. 297 (and
passim) for essential elements of the Memorandum.
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"Memorandum SANU," Duga, p. 31, Belgrade, June 1989. Partial Text: The economic
reform of 1965 was in essence a change in the basic strategic direction of social development: the
project ofpolitical democratization was substituted for a project ofeconomic liberalization. The idea
of self-management, whose essence is the dis-alienation of politics, was substituted for the idea of
decentralization, which brought about the establishment of regional centers of alienated power. The
ethics of solidarity and social justice were substituted for the spirit of possessive individualism and
apology of group interest. Political voluntarism, which was daring and dynamic in the first postwar
decades, when it could count on the mass support of the people, now became static and determined
in the defense of the system, even when it became evident that the system is inconsistent and
ineffective.
59Cited from an interview with Milosevic, "It Is Necessary To Find A Common Language
in the Preservation of Yugoslavia," Politika, p. 7, 22 Dec. 1989.
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IX. RED, BROWN, BLACK, GRAY SYMBIOSIS
Under the guidance of Milosevic, and driven by the media and the intelligentsia,
Serbia's old Communist regime (Red) forged a tenuous coalition with the non-communist
nationalists (Brown), the Serbian Orthodox Church (Black), and the Gray-uniformed and
Serbian dominated Yugoslav Peoples Army (YPA). This symbiosis supplied Milosevic with
the initial momentum and organization with which to consolidate his political power and
begin the violent march toward "Greater Serbia".
A. SERBIAN NATIONALISM (BROWN)
Nationalism has no rival either in mobilizing the masses against a common
threatening enemy or in its capacity to inspire self-sacrifice in defense of the home nation,
and Milosevic" clearly recognized this potential source ofpower and embraced it. The initial
and most significant of his political concessions might be described as the "Red/Brown"
symbiosis —or the Communist/Nationalist merger.60 By embracing and co-opting the
powerful force of Serbian nationalism (loyalty to "Greater Serbia"), Milosevic directed the
cultural wellspring of Serbian society into the service of the state, and more precisely, into
a personal force for self- preservation and power acquisition. He essentially fanned the
psychological flames of the Serbian masses for personal aggrandizement.
Serbian Nationalism is best described as authoritarian, exclusive and historically
nihilistic. The Serbs are convinced (or more precisely, have been convinced) that history has
treated them unfairly, they have never been justly rewarded for their noble idealism, but
rather have been consistently punished with humiliation and suffering —deprived of their
legitimate rights.
Vehement Serbian nationalism is undoubtedly Milosevic's source of strength and
power. The following is an excerpt from a speech delivered in Belgrade on 19 November,
1988:
60Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia, p. 32.
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"...This is no time for sorrow; it is a time for struggle, (indistinct shouting)
This awareness captured Serbia last summer and this awareness has turned
into a material force that will stop the terror in Kosovo and unite Serbia,
(indistinct shouting) This is a process which no longer can be stopped by any
force, a process in the face of which all fear is weak. People will even
consent to live in poverty but they will not consent to live without freedom,
at least not the people gathered here and the people in Serbia, to whom I
myself belong and therefore I know that they can only live in freedom and in
no other way. (indistinct shouting) Both the Turkish and the German
invaders know that these people win their battles for freedom." 6I
This passage is eerily reminiscent of a passage from Mien Kampf, in which Hitler
states "We as Aryans, are therefore able to imagine a State only to be the living organism of
a nationality which not only safeguards the preservation of that nationality but which, by
further training of its spiritual and ideal abilities, leads to its highest freedom". 62
Thus Milosevic began to promulgate the irresistible notion that loyalty to the Serbian
Nation, embodied in the ethnically pure "Greater Serbian" State, (not, by any means, the
Yugoslav State), was the key to survival of his Serbs. "Only unity can save the Serbs!" —a
motto emblazoned on the banners of Serbian nationalist banners— began to regularly appear
at scheduled and funded rallies throughout Serbia. Milosevic clearly recognized that
nationalism, as a mass emotion, was the most powerful political force operative in the
Balkans. Furthermore, those Serbs who refused to accept Milosevic's brand of Serbian
nationalism were classified as enemies of the people, and became increasingly more
vulnerable to persecution as traitors.
t
B. SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH (BLACK)
Another carefully cultivated and essential element of the symbiosis has been the
Serbian Orthodox church. Long mistreated and ignored —in fact often faced with savage
political assaults during the long period of post-WWII communist rule— the church suddenly
^Belgrade Domestic Service, November 19, 1988; in Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, Daily Report: Eastern Europe (hereafter, FBIS; Eastern Europe), November 21, 1988.
62Adolph Hitler, Mien Kampf p. 595, New York, 1940.
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found itself glorified in Milosevic's Serbian press. Priests began to participate in nationalist
demonstrations, espousing the alleged evils of Catholicism and Mohammedanism, which,
understandably, served to further increase the cultural distance between Serbia and the other
Balkan communities; specifically the predominately Catholic regions within Croatia and the
Bosnian Muslims. V.P. Gagnon explains that:
"The relation to religious identity is a complex issue, and is related to the fact
that in traditional Serbian national mythology, born in the fight against the
Ottomans, the Muslim Turks are seen as the ultimate enemy. Although
religion per se was minimally relevant to interpersonal relations in
Yugoslavia before the most recent wars, as part of the Serbian national
mythology it was drawn upon in a selective way to the political ends of
demonizing Albanians and Slavic Muslims."63
Symbolic ofthe extent ofthe Red-Black political collaboration, the Serbian Orthodox
Church played a key role as the Milosevic government marked the 600th anniversary of the
battle of Kosovo, on 28 June of 1989; a "made-for-the-media" exploitation of Serbian
cultural symbols.
"Where the pre-Milosevic Serbian press had excoriated the Serbian Church for
meddling in nationalism, under Milosevic^ Politika (a Belgrade newspaper) praised the
Serbian Orthodox Church for its service to the Serbian people, and even declared that
Orthodoxy was the spiritual basis for and the most essential component of the national
identity (of Serbs)."64 By embracing the Orthodox Church, the primordial wellspring of
Serbian culture, Milosevic added strength and legitimacy to his movement.
As reward for its loyal "service", the Serbian Orthodox Church has benefited in
several important areas since 1987; including extensive church rebuilding programs and
religious instruction (replacing Marxist indoctrination) in the Serbian public schools. In
January of 1990, Orthodox Christmas was publicly celebrated in downtown Belgrade for the
"V.P. Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia",
International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, p. 141 (note 24), Winter 1994/95.
'"Cited from the Serbian newspaper Politika, p. 18, 2 September 1990, in Sabrina Ramet's
Balkan Babel, p. 161, Westview Press, Boulder, 1992.
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first time in 40 years, and pictures of Milosevic have been seen among the religious icons
during Orthodox services.65
However, in addition to merely blessing the new nationalist fervor, the Church has
also played a more sinister role in the Milosevic grand strategy. For instance, the Serbian
warlord Zeljko Raznatovic {nom de guerre: Arkan), who has personally led and participated
in the most heinous of Serbian atrocities, received his initial assistance "above all" from the
Serbian Orthodox Church in organizing, financing, and arming his irregular militia. 66
The Orthodox Church media has also been responsible for much of the anti-Islamic
fervor which began to grip Serbia in the late 1980's. Emphasizing the alleged Muslim threat,
an Orthodox priest from Bosnia-Herzegovina claimed that "for the last few decades we
(Serbs) have also become known for being the target of sudden pressure of Jihad from
fundamentalist Islam."67 An article in Pravoslavlje, an official church publication, stressed
that the Serbs were engaged in a struggle between the Serbian defenders ofpeace and the evil
forces of oppression. 68 War was essentially depicted by the Church as a religious experience
for the Serbs.
Radovan Karadzic, the Montenegrin-born psychiatrist, leader of the Bosnian Serbs
and President of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia, has claimed that the Muslim state in
Bosnia-Herzegovina must "be controlled", and that the Serbs (as the most powerful nation
in the Balkans) are in fact "doing that for all of Europe... to make sure Islamic
fundamentalism doesn't infect Europe from the south".69
65Ramet, Balkan Babel, p. 161
.
^Interview with Arkan by Toma Dzadzic, "Vec imam kucu na Dedinju" (I Already Have a
House on Dedinje), NIN, p. 1 1, December 13, 1991. Cited in Cigar, Genocide, p.36.




69John Pomfret, "Pact May Restore Utilities in Sarajevo," Washington Post, p. A8, July 13,
1993.
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In 1 992, portraying the conflict as an assault against Christianity, Serbian Orthodox
Bishop Antanasije warned that "militant Islam has used the conflict to establish a foothold
in the Balkans... the West is not aware of the penetration of Islam... where mosques are
rising where there were none before."70
As late as January of 1993, the Serbian Ministry of Information continued to publish
inflammatory anti-Muslim propaganda. The following was written for the Ministry by a
Serbian Orthodox Priest:
"They (the Muslims) want, for the second time, to create a Turkish Bosnia or
a Bosnia in Turkey... with the Shariatic law and other life norms
unacceptable in the twenty-first century. Behind all this is a century-old (sic)
dream of a primitive man to live off the backs of the subjugated people, to
have his own harem, dreaming of Istanbul, where, according to him, there is
a paradise on earth, where "fairies are bathing in sherbet". They (the
Muslims) invited to this bloody feast all other worldly bums, murderers and
dogs of war. Mujahedins (sic) and Jihad fanatics from the Islamic countries
(came) to fulfill their "sacred duty" and to exterminate us. This
unscrupulousness completely fits their religion and tradition and culture."71
C. THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE'S ARMY (GRAY)
Formerly the protector of Yugoslavia as a whole —not particular nationalist groups--
the pre-Milosevid Yugoslav People's Army (YPA/JNA) was considered dogmatic,
conservative and fiercely anti-democratic. At the beginning of the conflict (June 1991) the
Officer Corps was 65 percent Serbian, and this percentage increased when Croatian and
Slovene officers left, as the secession movements (Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina) gained momentum. V.P. Gagnon explains that in 1989 the Yugoslav Peoples
Army...
"... openly sided with (Milosevic's) conservative positions and harshly
attacked the political opposition. In the military itself, conservative
70Andrew Borowiec, "Serbian Bishop Warns ofMuslims' Gains in the Balkans," Washington
Times, p. A9, September 30, 1992.
71
Fr. Savo Knezevic, "Extermination of Serbs~In Pictures and Words", Serbia: Documents,
Comments, Interviews, p. 17, Republic of Serbia Ministry of Information, Belgrade, January 15,
1993.
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Marxist-Leninist indoctrination was stepped up. The army also endorsed
Milosevic's neo-socialist economic and political program, stressing in
particular continued monopoly of the communist party and recentralization
of the state. In cooperation with Serbian conservatives, the military openly
attacked reformists' calls to democratize the country, to reduce the military's
political role and to reform the military-industrial complex. Statements by top
army officers made it clear that they viewed the Army's internal mission in
orthodox ideological terms."72
However, through favorable press coverage, political nurturing and fiscal
inducement, and with an overwhelming number of Serbian officers, the army eventually
became the fighting arm of Serbian nationalism; and, at the outbreak of hostilities with
Croatia in 1991, it was under the direct personal control of Milosevic^
Senior presidential aide, Borislav Jovie, said that in April of 1991, more than 2
months before war broke out in Croatia:
"We decided to change tactics. We would deploy troops in Serb areas of
Croatia, the Croats would provoke war, and we would then take those
territories (Krajina)... We knew that when Bosnia was recognized, we'd be
seen as aggressors because our army was there. So Milosevic and I talked it
over, and we realized we'd have to pull a fast one. We transferred all the
Bosnian Serbs in our Yugoslav Army to their forces and promised to pay all
their costs (which created an extremely well-armed Bosnian Serb force...)"73
By 1992, at the outbreak of hostilities with Bosnia-Hercegovina, the army was firmly
under the personal control of the Belgrade regime:
"The general staff in Belgrade is obedient to Milosevic. Belgrade doesn't
plan only the movement of Serbian forces... The war in BH
(Bosnia-Hercegovina) was carefully planned by the top political and military
leadership in Belgrade. In BH, Mladec has multi-channel communications to
both his subordinate commanders and to the (Belgrade) general staff and
Milosevic." And further, "Despite Milosevic's assertion that there were only
2,000 or so paramilitaries—he calls them 'bandits and killers' —responsible
for the war crimes, (a former diplomat concludes) that it was an elaborate and
very systematic series of campaigns, employing a combination of military
72Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict - The Case of Serbia," p. 152.
73Roger Cohen, "Peace in the Balkans Now Relies on the Man Who Fanned Its Wars," New
York Times, p. A6, 31 October, 1995.
40
assets and local para- militaries. They didn't sweep through 70% of the
country in three months using local maniacs."74
Throughout the conflict, the military strategy of the Serbs consisted of overrunning
and "ethnically cleansing" weakly defended areas after a period of prolonged and merciless
bombardment and siege from a distance; seeking minimum Serbian military and maximum
Croatian and/or Bosnian civilian casualties. Yet, the Serbian army, while appearing to be
formidable, has been plagued by low motivation, poor discipline and a lack of manpower.
Additionally, the Serbian forces have been overextended and lack sufficient manpower to
carry out concentrated campaigns on more than one front at a time. These thin forces were
indeed vulnerable to commando attacks and guerrilla warfare behind their lines, and the
Bosnian government were successful in this type of warfare.





A. IN THE WAKE OF MILOSEVIC'S MARCH TO "GREATER SERBIA"
The international community has witnessed a ruthless and violent conflict within the
former Yugoslavia during the past several years. 75 Several questions come to mind: How
effectively has Milosevic been able to move toward his "Greater Serbia"? What was his
strategy for regaining (or acquiring) Serbian territory? And finally, was this action really
"genocide", or a legitimate attempt to liberate the Serbian people throughout Yugoslavia?
B. ETHNIC CLEANSING?
The Serbian regime, after years of culturally re-coding their population and preparing
for war, finally launched a violent and systematic campaign of annihilation in 1991. The
stated goal was to "protect Serbs" from genocidal Catholics and Muslims throughout the
former Yugoslavia, and re-gain traditional Serbian regions; the real operational strategy was
to "cleanse" great tracts territory of all potential political rivals and populations, and forge
a new "Greater Serbia" within the boundaries of the former Yugoslavia. All "non-Serbs"
within critical border regions (Krajina, Slavonia, Eastern Bosnia) and corridors (Posavina)
were to be permanently displaced; all men of fighting age (potential resistance) killed,
women and children brutally terrorized into flight.
"Ethnic cleansing", as it came to be called, was not the result of tribal warfare, it was
the means by which the Serbian regime sought to consolidate power both at home and within
the newly acquired territories. Moreover, the killing was not wanton and random massacre
—as was often depicted by the press— but a closely controlled and coordinated exercise —and
initially very successful.
75Two particularly thorough publications describing the horrors of "ethnic cleansing" are:
Gutman, Roy; A Witness to Genocide, Macmillan Publishing, New York, 1993, (1993 Pulitzer Prize
Winner); and Reiff, David, Slaughterhouse -Bosnia and the Failure ofthe West, Simon and Schuster,
NewYork,1995.
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In March 1989, the CIA concluded an assessment of "atrocities" which had been
committed in Bosnia. The report states that:
"90 percent of the acts of "ethnic cleansing" were carried out by Serbs (and)
leading Serbian politicians almost certainly played a role in the crimes... in
a systematic attempt to eliminate all traces of other ethnic groups from their
territory... the systematic nature of the Serbian actions strongly suggest that
Pale and perhaps Belgrade exercised a carefully veiled role in the purposeful
destruction and dispersal of non-Serb populations... it makes clear with
concrete evidence that there was a conscious, coherent and systematic
Serbian policy to get rid of Muslims, through murders torture and
imprisonment... premeditated attacks on Bosnia's Muslim population...
particularly intense in the towns of Prijedor, Banja Luka, Zvornik, Bijeljina,
Vlasenica, Foca and Trebinje... with an intensity, sustained orchestration and
scale... which pales to the alleged atrocities committed by the Croatian and
Bosnian forces."76
Faced with the daunting task of moving hundreds of thousands of people from their
traditional homelands, as quickly and efficiently as possible, the Serbian regime had
unleashed both regular Army and (often psychopathic) "irregular" forces on the populations
of Croatian Krajina and Bosnia-Herzegovina. James O. Jackson offers this account of
Serbian brutality:
"The war has been as ugly as any in history. At least 85% of the 200,000
killed in three years of fighting have been civilians. An additional 4 million
have become refugees, most ofthem driven from their homes in pogroms of
"ethnic cleansing". Survivors tell of concentration camps, brutal guards,
starvation rations, killing grounds, mass graves. They remember a sadist
called the Butcher, the killer gang known as the Jokers. They have witnessed
summary executions, decapitations, human beings being thrown on bonfires.
Some still hear the moans of raped women, the shrieks of terrified children,
the howls ofmen under torture."77
Milosevic's carefully planned and orchestrated campaign to secure his own position
as omnipotent Serbian master indeed proceeded almost unhindered for many months,
76Roger Cohen, "CIA Report on Bosnia Blames Serbs for 90% of the War Crimes," New
York Times, p. 1, 9 march 1995.
77James O. Jackson, "The Balkans -No Rush To Judgment," Time Magazine, 27 June 1994.
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eventually capturing almost 70% of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Professor Albert Wohlstetter, a
vocal critic of western policy in the Balkans, describes the conflict in the following manner:
"Since June 1991, the United States has used its own diplomacy and the UN
Security Council in a grim charade of "neutral mediation" between a Serbian
genocidal aggressor and his victims... this enormous human catastrophe is
not the unintended byproduct of war: It is ethnic cleansing, the deliberate
slaughter of innocent civilians, the destruction of their private homes and
public places of worship and assembly, and the systematic rape ofwomen to
inspire terror and flight for the strategic purpose of creating a Slobodan
Milosevic's Greater Serbia."78
C. THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL CHARTER
The Nuremberg Tribunal Charter was drafted in 1945 with the establishment of the
Nuremberg tribunal. Article 6 (c) and (d)79 of that charter define War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity; there can be little doubt that there have been numerous incidents which
fall within these definitions, but what about the charges of genocide?
According to Rafael Lemkin, whose influence led the term to be incorporated into
the Geneva conventions,
"Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate
destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all
members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of
different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life
78Wohlstetter, Albert, "Genocide by Embargo," The Wall Street Journal, 9 May 1994.
79Nuremberg Tribunal Charter, Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution
of Axis Criminality, Nazi conspiracy andAggression: Opinion and Judgment, pp. 3-4, Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1947.
(c) War Crimes : Namely, violations of the laws and customs of war. Such violations shall
include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment, or deportation to slave labor or for any other
purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners ofwar
or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction
of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.
(d) Crimes against Humanity : Namely murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or
persecutions on political racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the jurisdiction ofthe Tribunal, whether or not in violation ofthe domestic law of the country
perpetrated.
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of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The
objectives of such a plan would be the disintegration of the political and
social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the
economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal
security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals
belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as
an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in
their individual capacity but as members of a national group."80
Based on Mr. Lemkin's definition of "genocide", and given the detailed and
horrifying accounts of the systematic campaign of annihilation, there should be little doubt
that the intent of the Serbian regime was essential "genocidal" from the very beginning.
Ibrahim Kajan argues that although the violence in Yugoslavia does not technically fall
within the letter of the United Nation's definition of genocide81 , the atrocities committed
certainly should be considered as such:
"There are many shortcomings in the United Nations Convention on
Genocide... for example... cultural genocide is not considered in the
Convention... and all the great powers (have been) against condemning this
form of genocide. In every crime the intent is primary. Horrific mass
murders may still not be considered an act of genocide, if the principal
motive is not the destruction of a nation, an ethnic group or a religion. There
exists clear and unambiguous evidence that the violence carried out against
80Cited in "Beyond the 1 948 Convention ~ Emerging principles of Genocide in Customary
International Law," Maryland Journal of International Law and Trade , vol. 17, no. 2, Fall 1993,
pp. 193-226.
81In the United Nations' Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, dated December 11, 1946, Article II defines the following as genocide: Any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical, racial, or
religious group, as such:
a. Killing members of the group;
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
*Article II specifies which actions within this scope are punishable: (a) genocide, (b) conspiracy to
commit genocide, (c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide, (d) attempt to commit
genocide, (e) complicity in genocide.
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the Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina represents a process of systematic and
intentional genocide. Furthermore, the evidence can be clearly
documented."82
Norman Cigar also proposes that, given the overwhelming documentation of both
Serbian intent and actual operational execution, the case of Yugoslavia should be
re-examined vis-a-vis the definition of genocide:
"Specific intent , though a key aspect of legal proceedings in criminal law, is
difficult to prove in most circumstances involving genocide, as perpetrators
are often anxious to conceal their actions. Scholars have proposed, instead,
that the destruction of a group by "purposive action" be sufficient to qualify
an act as genocide. Neither is the complete destruction of a group required
for violence to qualify as genocide, as this act would develop by degrees
along an continuum."83
One cannot help but wonder —after years of "early warning" clearly emanating from
Serbia proper; Milosevic's ruthless march to power based on a very dangerous brand of
hyper-nationalism; the cultural re-coding of an entire society through a relentless media
campaign of horrific disinformation; the inevitable unleashing of a terrified Serbian
population on its unsuspecting neighbors; and the resultant attempted annihilation of those
neighbors and their culture; Why, then, does the international community —and especially
the West— continue to insist that the conflict has been nothing more than an unfortunate
quarrel between traditional tribal rivals? Why the hesitancy to call the whole affair as it was
(and still is); an intentional, systematic and very nearly successful "genocide" directed at the
Bosnian Muslims of former Yugoslavia?
Patrick Glynn offers a very troubling explanation,
"By the fall of 1992, according to several former officials, the State
Department had enough evidence to produce a legal finding of "genocide"
82
Ali, Rabia and Lifscultz, Lawrence, Why Bosnia? - Writings on the Bosnian War, p. 87,
Pamphleteer's Press, Stony Creek, Connecticut, 1993.
83Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia, p. 8.
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against Serbia —but such charges were blocked, for fear the United States
would be required to intervene under the 1 95 1 Genocide Convention." 84
84Patrick Glynn, "See No Evil," The New Republic, p. 26, 25 October 1993.
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XI. CONCLUSION
"The current major conflicts taking place along ethnic lines throughout the
world have as their main causes not ancient hatreds, but rather the purposeful
actions of political actors who actively create violent conflict, selectively
drawing on history in order to portray it as historically inevitable."85
Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic may not stand alone as the sole cause of the
ongoing Balkan conflict, but, as this thesis has highlighted, he certainly shoulders a heavy
responsibility. Beginning in 1987, he unleashed and rationally manipulated as violent a
nationalistic movement as Europe has witnessed since World War II; and ruthlessly guided
his decaying nation toward a fleeting vision of "Greater Serbia" —leaving hundreds of
thousands dead, and millions of Yugoslavs homeless. Moreover, as a Western diplomat said
in the fall of 1 995, Milosevic not only brutally sacrificed "non-Serbs" in his personal struggle
for power, but...
"...cold-bloodedly sacrificed the 170,000 Serbs of the Krajina because he
wants a wealthy little country he can rule for 20 years. He never even made
a public statement about them. Of course, there's no accountability in the
Balkans, but one suspects a day of reckoning must come". 86
Unfortunately, that day of reckoning, currently embodied in the War Crimes
Tribunal, will almost certainly bypass Milosevic himself —the "Great Peacemaker" of
Dayton— settling instead on his primary lieutenants, the Bosnian Serbs. Martin Peretz sums
up the Serbian President's performance at the recent Dayton Peace talks:
"What possibly could bring about the bonding of Slobodan Milosevic, the
brute aggressor in the conflict, with Holbrooke and Warren Christopher?
Alas, it seems, it didn't take much. Milosevic did some singing at the piano,
(a rendition of 'Tenderly,' according to the times), he displayed a crass
geniality, he was able to silence (temporarily) his more recalcitrant Serbian
comrades, he played a splendid game of tennis. And, of course, he had the
savvy understanding that what is required now may merely be a decent
85Gagnon, "The Case of Serbia", p. 164.
86Roger Cohen, "Serbs Of 'Greater Serbia' Find Suffering and Decay," New York Times,
p. Al, 17 September, 1995.
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interval for President Clinton. Poof, Milosevic is no longer accountablefor
the killings he sponsored'\ 87
Astonishingly, (at least to this author) the Serbian "Pied Piper" himself has been
ceremoniously entrusted with the future of Yugoslavia! —The march toward "Greater Serbia"
(or now, as one State Department wit termed it, "Greater Serbia Lite") continues.
The message, in this time of post cold war uncertainty and regional volatility, is
indeed a dangerous one. As Ivo Banac points out:
"What Milosevic has done, and with greater effectiveness than many realize,
is to demonstrate that there are no real restrictions on aggressive behavior.
This will simply give carte blanche to Milosevics everywhere, ofwhom there
are and will be quite a few."88
What, then, might be done to stem this sort of ethnic violence in the future? Clearly,
the international community must remain vigilant, recognize the early warning signs of
pending regional catastrophe, and act early and decisively with diplomatic, economic, and
even military force to curtail the violence.
For the United States, all of the various intelligence agencies —and particularly the
State Department— must train, employ and trust their regional desk officers as the eyes and
ears America. Unfortunately, in the case of Yugoslavia, despite the efforts of a handful of
excellent State Department officers, the frantic predictions of "disaster" were neglected by
key decision makers.
Moreover, especially in the case of Yugoslavia, the international community might
have checked the spread of paranoia within Serbia proper through an aggressive
"information" campaign beginning as early as 1987. Milosevic's extensive use of the media
was a critical —yet highly vulnerable— medium for popular mobilization; and a concentrated
effort to combat the disinformation spewing forth from Belgrade into the minds of all Serbs
throughout the region —an accurate account of events and information— might have had a
profound effect on the calamitous chain of events.
87Martin Peretz, The New Republic, p. 46, December 18, 1995 (Emphasis added).
88Ivo Banac, "Separating History From Myth", in Ali and Lifscultz, Why Bosnia?, p. 150.
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Albert Wohlstetter offers a suggestion as to how the international community might
have checked the Serbian nationalist juggernaut,
"A key role could be played by political appeals and accurate political
information transmitted... especially over television channels, where most
Yugoslavs get their news... it would replace Milosevic's TV broadcasts with
accurate political and military information, and political appeals to the many
Serbs who oppose Milosevic's program for a Greater Serbia."89
The lessons from the Yugoslav conflict, especially regarding hyper-nationalist
manipulation by empowered elites, must not be soon forgotten.
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